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Abstract
The acquisition of information prior to sale gives rise to a hold-up
situation quite naturally. Yet, while the bulk of the literature on the
hold-up problem considers negotiations under symmetric information
where cooperative short-cuts such as split the di¤erence capture the
outcome of bargaining, in the present setting, parties negotiate un-
der asymmetric information where the outcome must be derived from
a non-cooperative bargaining procedure. To avoid the di¢ cult task
of specifying and solving complicated games combining elements of
signalling and screening, but to still compare incentives for acquiring
information under voluntary versus mandatory disclosure, use of con-
ditions such as incentive, disclosure and participation constraints only
is made that are common to all non-cooperative bargaining outcomes.
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1 Introduction
More than two thousand years ago, Cicero in de o¢ ciisconstructed cases
of contracting parties who had struck a deal under asymmetric information
prior to sale. If Rhodos is su¤ering from a famine and a seller is shipping
crop to Rhodos, does he report of other boats approaching with crop or does
he remain silent in order to obtain a higher price? Or if a seller sells gold
but thinks he sells brass, does the buyer tell him or does he silently buy gold
at the price of brass? Ever since Cicero, legal scholars have kept debating
about circumstances when such contracts should be enforced and when not.
Mistake is accepted as a valid formation defense in many legal systems.
The German civil code for example, in its section on voidability for mistake,
o¤ers the following rule: "A person who, when making a declaration of intent,
was mistaken about its contents or had no intention whatsoever of making a
declaration with this content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed
that he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of the factual
position and with a sensible understanding of the case" (German civil code §
119 BGB). In addition to general rules from contract law, legal systems may
provide remedies that are specic for transactions on markets for equity or
insurance contracts and may impose duties to disclose explicitly.
Kronman (1978) was among the rst to approach the issue from a law and
economics perspective. His analysis departs from an apparent inconsistency
in contract law. On the one hand, there exist contract cases where a promisor,
due to unilateral mistake, is excused from performance. On the other hand,
there also exist cases where a party is entitled to withhold information. To
resolve the issue, he proposes the following theory. The law tends to recognize
a right to deal with others without disclosing what he knows provided that
the information is the result of a deliberate and costly search. Such a right,
however, is not recognized where the information has casually been acquired.
Shavell (1994), being stimulated by Kronmans article, introduced a for-
mal model to explore a closely related issue in greater depth and in line
with insights from information economics. He compares the incentives to
acquire information prior to sale under mandatory disclosure versus volun-
tary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure is meant to capture those cases where
the informed party has the right to deal without disclosing. Mandatory dis-
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closure, in contrast, may reect these other cases where the informed party
will e¤ectively be led to disclose as, otherwise, her partner may be excused
from performance. Shavells main conclusions are as follows. Voluntary dis-
closure generates excessive incentives for acquiring information. Mandatory
disclosure is socially desirable for sellers whereas, for buyers, the right to deal
without disclosing may be required to spur acquisition of socially desirable
information.
The present paper considers a model quite similar to the one examined
by Shavell. Nonetheless, rather di¤erent conclusions will emerge from my
analysis. Voluntary disclosure need not generate excessive incentives to ac-
quire information. Voluntary disclosure may result in even lower incentives
than mandatory disclosure. Incentives to acquire information under manda-
tory disclosure remain insu¢ cient quite generally. The distinction between
buyers and sellers acquiring information may be of lesser signicance than
suggested by Shavell.
Shavells results rest on the following assumptions. First, the informed
party is assumed to unilaterally propose the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis which, under symmetric information at least, means that the informed
party is given the entire bargaining power. Second, the parameters of his
model are chosen such that the buyer is commonly known to value the good
higher than the seller (trivial trade decision). Third, to establish that the
buyer has vanishing incentives under required disclosure, Shavell introduces
a rather peculiar assumption of how the uninformed seller would value the
good outside the relationship.
The present paper di¤ers in that it allows for more general bargaining pro-
cedures, including those where both parties have positive bargaining power.
Cases are included where it depends on the acquired information whether
trade should take place on e¢ ciency grounds or not (non-trivial trade deci-
sion).
My setting is reminiscent of the hold-up literature as pioneered by Gross-
man and Hart (1986). In that literature, relationship-specic investments are
undertaken without being contractible. At the (re-) negotiation stage, parties
bargain under symmetric information and are assumed to share the negoti-
ation surplus in xed proportions, well in line with cooperative bargaining
theory.
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In the present setting, parties invest in acquiring information prior to sale.
Such investments, by nature, are not contractually protected when negotia-
tions start. It is this absent protection that causes the hold-up situation.
At the negotiation stage, the informational setting depends on the legal
disclosure regime. To begin with, suppose an e¤ective regime of mandatory
disclosure prior to sale is in place such that negotiations take place among
symmetrically informed parties. Therefore, in line with the hold-up litera-
ture, parties may be assumed to share the negotiation surplus (if any) in
xed proportions. Split the di¤erence, e.g., as predicted by Nashs coopera-
tive bargaining solution would correspond to equal bargaining power for both
parties.
Unless the party who acquires information is assigned the entire bargain-
ing power, she must share the fruits of her investments with the other party
which then leads to the underinvestment result well known from the hold-
up literature. In other words, under mandatory disclosure and at less than
full bargaining power, incentives to acquire information would typically seem
positive but insu¢ cient, no matter whether it is the seller or the buyer who
acquires information.
For conceptual reasons, examining incentives to acquire information un-
der voluntary disclosure proves more demanding. A regime of voluntary
disclosure necessarily entails bargaining under asymmetric information such
that the convenient shortcut of a cooperative solution concept (split the
di¤erence, e.g.) is no longer available. As a way out, the negotiated out-
come must rather be derived from a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative bargaining game. Shavell, in fact, has considered a simple bar-
gaining procedure of take-it-or-leave-it nature.
The present paper allows for more general bargaining games whose so-
lutions, however, may remain di¢ cult to determine explicitly. Fortunately,
as it turns out, the exact form of the bargaining procedure does not matter
and its explicit solution can be dispensed with. To make my point, exclusive
use is made of constraints that are common to all equilibrium outcomes of
non-cooperative bargaining games.
Of particular importance will be the disclosure and participation con-
straints. Participation constraints are derived from the fact that each party
may unilaterally enforce the outside option simply by not signing the con-
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tract. Disclosure constraints result from the assumption that the informed
party, by disclosing voluntarily, can trigger the cooperative bargaining solu-
tion, in line with the hold-up literature. The disclosure constraints reect
the informed partys incentives to disclose whenever disclosing promises a
higher payo¤ as compared with the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of
the non-cooperative bargaining game.
As mentioned before, the non-cooperative game will not be specied ex-
plicitly but the reader may think of some particular bargaining procedure
that would lead, if played among symmetrically informed parties, to sharing
the surplus in the proportions of the underlying cooperative solution.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the general model is
introduced and, for later reference, the rst best solution is examined. Sec-
tion 3 deals with the legal regime where mandatory disclosure is e¤ectively
imposed. Negotiations take place under symmetric information and parties
share the negotiation surplus in xed proportions. This version of the model
shares its structure exactly with those from the hold-up literature and, as a
consequence, it also features the same tendency for underinvestment (relative
to rst best).
Section 4 deals with incentives under voluntary disclosure. The outcome
of negotiations is based on a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative
bargaining game. Disclosure, participation and incentive constraints are de-
rived for the general version of the decision problem. Under voluntary disclo-
sure, it is shown that, quite generally, incentives to acquire information are
(at least weakly) excessive but only under the provision that the party ac-
quiring information has the entire bargaining power (Shavells assumption).
In section 5, the model is restricted to binary trade decisions. Moreover,
I distinguish selsh from cooperative acquisition of information. I borrow
these terms from Che and Chung (1999) who have compared incentives for
investments that either directly a¤ect the valuation of the investing or that of
the non-investing party. In my case, investments do not a¤ect the valuations
themselves but rather may reveal information concerning their true values.
For a setting of selsh acquisition, incentives to acquire information are
shown to be lower than rst best but higher as compared with mandatory
disclosure. In this setting, voluntary disclosure outperforms mandatory dis-
closure on e¢ ciency grounds.
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For a setting of cooperative acquisition, however, the welfare ranking is
shown to be reverse. While mandatory disclosure, due to the hold-up situ-
ation, still provides insu¢ cient incentives to acquire information, voluntary
disclosure would generate even lower incentives. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The general setting is as follows. Parties A and B face some decision q from
a given set Qp of alternatives. While Qp contains all pure decisions, let Q
denote the set of all mixed decisions. The set Q consists of all probability
distributions over the set of pure decisions.
The decision q will eventually emerge from bargaining. I have two inter-
pretations in mind. Either the decision concerns the quantity of a commodity
to be traded in which case Qp could be interpreted as the real line (or a sub-
set of it). Or the trade decision is of binary nature Qp = f0; 1g such that
Q = [0; 1] coincides with the unit interval with the interpretation that q 2 Q
corresponds to the probability with which trade takes place.
In any case, the set Qp of pure decisions is assumed to contain the par-
ticular decision q = 0 not to trade at all (outside option).
The parties payo¤s may be uncertain. Uncertainty is captured by a
random move ! of nature from the outcome space 
. This outcome space
is endowed with a probability measure  in the sense that, for any event

0  
, the value (
0) denotes the probability of this event.
By assumption, party A is the only one to acquire information. She has
the option to learn the true move of nature with probability x 2 X  [0; 1]
by investing e¤ort k(x) expressed in monetary equivalent. For convenience
and in line with the hold-up literature, the decision x will be referred to as
investments.1 Investments are assumed specic to As potential relationship
with some given party B.
In the following, I refer to A and B as buyer and seller, respectively. At
1Notice, in Shavell (1994), parties di¤er in their exogenously given costs of being in-
formed. The present model, in contrast, introduces the probability of being informed as a
decision variable such that the incentives to be informed can be explored. Yet, the di¤er-
ence in modelling is rather a matter of taste than of substance. Under both approaches,
it is the value of being informed only that matters.
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pure decision q 2 Qp and move of nature ! 2 
, party As utility amounts to
v(!; q) whereas party Bs costs amount to c(!; q). But notice, no assumptions
on the signs of these functions are imposed such that parties A and B could
equally well be in the reverse roles of seller and buyer, respectively (just
reinterpret v as minus the cost function and c as minus the utility function).
At not trade, utility and costs are assumed to vanish, i.e. v(!; 0) = c(!; 0) =
0 holds for any move ! of nature.
If q 2 Q is a mixed decision, I denote by V (!; q) and C(!; q) the expected
utility and the expected costs under the probabilistic decision q. Social sur-
plus then amounts to S(!; q) = V (!; q)  C(!; q).
Also notice, while it is party A who acquires information, neither her
utility function V (!; q) nor social surplus S(!; q) include investment costs
k(x). This convention proves useful as investments are decided prior to sale.
At the negotiation stage, investment costs are sunk.
Both parties are assumed risk-neutral. Therefore, if the true move of
nature ! is known, the rst best solution requires an ex post e¢ cient decision
q(!) 2 argmax
q2Q
S(!; q)
being taken whereas if the move of nature is not known, an ex ante e¢ cient
decision
q0 2 argmax
q2Q
E [S(!; q)]
would be the collective optimum. For later reference, let me dene the re-
sulting surplus (rst best) as (!) = S(!; q(!)) and 0(!) = S(!; q0),
respectively. Both are contingent on the true move ! of nature even if the
decision qo is not.
The rst best solution requires investments
x 2 argmax
x2X
w(x)
that maximize expected surplus w(x): Expected surplus net of search costs
amounts to
w(x) = E[0(!)] + x    k(x)
where
 = E[(!)  0(!)]  0
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denotes the social gain from being informed. By denition, this gain can
never be negative and it will be strictly positive whenever the information
has social value.
After having described the model and its rst best solution, which will
serve as a reference point, the remaining sections deal with deriving and
comparing the incentives to acquire information under rules of mandatory
versus voluntary disclosure as well as relative to rst best.
3 The hold-up problem under mandatory dis-
closure
In the present setting, the two parties are assumed to negotiate under a rule
of mandatory disclosure. At the time of contracting, party As e¤ort is sunk
and either A knows the true move of nature or she does not. By assumption,
if A knows it to be ! then, under mandatory disclosure, she meets her duty
to disclose ! truthfully. If, however, A does not know the true move she
cannot disclose. In either case, bargaining takes place among symmetrically
informed parties if information sharing is governed by e¤ective mandatory
disclosure.
Under symmetric information, well in line with the hold-up literature,
let me assume that parties A and B share the surplus in xed proportions,
 +  = 1; where   0 and   0 reect the bargaining power of A
and B, respectively. I further assume that the parties reservation utility
outside their relationship is normalized to zero. As a consequence, party
As and party Bs negotiated payo¤s will amount to   (!) and   (!),
respectively, if A has learned and, hence, disclosed the true move ! of nature
whereas they amount to   E[0(!)] and   E[0(!)], respectively, if A has
not learned it.
Anticipating these contracted payo¤s, party A has the incentive of being
informed with probability xm that maximizes her objective function (m refers
to mandatory disclosure)
m(x) = E[  o(!)] + x m   k(x)
where As private gain from being informed amounts to the fraction m =
  of the corresponding social gain.
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For the rest of the paper it is assumed that party As investments x
remain hidden to party B.
The following proposition recalls the underinvestment result well-known
from the hold-up literature.
Proposition 1 Suppose investments x maximize the expected surplus whereas
investments xm maximize party As objective function under mandatory dis-
closure, i.e. x 2 argmaxxw(x) and xm 2 argmaxx m(x). Then investment
incentives compare as follows.
(i) If   > 0 then xm  x.
(ii) If   = 0 then argmaxx2X w(x) = argmaxx2X m(x):
Proof. (i) Since the di¤erence w(x) m(x) of the two objective functions
is strongly monotonically increasing if    > 0, for all x from the range
x < xm, it follows that
w(x)  m(x) < w(xm)  m(xm)
and, hence,
w(x) < w(xm)  [m(xm)  m(x)]  w(xm)
must hold. Therefore, the welfare function w(x) attains a maximum at no x
from the range x < xm. Claim (i) is established.
(ii) If   = 0 then the two objective functions w(x) and m(x) di¤er
by a constant term only, from which the second claim follows easily.
Notice, the above proof remains valid for any shape of the cost function
k(x). By imposing suitable di¤erentiability, however, the rst claim could
be strengthen to strictly insu¢ cient incentives xm < x under mandatory
disclosure.
The second claim generalizes Shavells e¢ ciency result to my more gen-
eral model. In fact, if party A who acquires information is given the entire
bargaining power, i.e.  = 1, then  = 0 and, hence,    = 0 must
always be fullled. Therefore, under mandatory disclosure, the rst best so-
lution prevails quite generally provided that party A has the entire bargaining
power.
Finally, again under suitable di¤erentiability of the cost function k(x),
incentives are easily shown to remain strictly positive under mandatory dis-
closure, i.e. xm > 0, if party As share from benets of being informed is
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positive, i.e. if    > 0 holds. At rst glance, positive incentives seem
at odds with Shavells ndings of vanishing incentives for buyers to acquire
information under mandatory disclosure. The discrepancy, however, is due
to Shavells implicit assumption of a non-vanishing outside option which he
imposes but only if it is the buyer who acquires information.
4 Voluntary disclosure
In this section, the legal regime is explored where the disclosure of informa-
tion is at the discretion of party A. Yet, even if disclosure is not mandatory,
party A may still voluntarily disclose. More precisely, the following informa-
tional setting is imposed.
If A does not learn the true move of nature, she cannot produce any
evidence at all and, hence, she must remain silent. In particular, she cannot
credibly communicate the fact that she is uninformed.
If, however, A learns the true move ! of nature, she may either voluntarily
disclose ! truthfully or may hide it, but she cannot reveal any untrue move
of nature.
Notice, if A discloses the (true) move ! of nature, negotiations take place
under symmetric information such that the (ex post) e¢ cient surplus (!)
is shared in xed proportions a  (!) and   (!) among the two parties,
as under the rule of mandatory disclosure explored in the previous section.
If, however, party A remains silent then party B does not know whether
such silence is due to A having not learned the true move of nature or whether
A knows the true move of nature but prefers hiding it. As a consequence,
parties are asymmetrically informed whenever party A remains silent and,
hence, sharing the e¢ cient surplus in xed proportions is no longer available
as a convenient shortcut to capture the negotiated outcome.
In such a situation of asymmetric information, the bargaining procedure
should be specied as a non-cooperative game. Shavell, e.g., imposes that
(the potentially informed) party A makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to party
B. Other games may be considered as well. In any case, the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a given bargaining procedure will serve as the predicted out-
come of negotiations among the two asymmetrically informed parties.
The equilibrium analysis could be quite tedious and equilibrium may fail
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to be unique. To avoid specifying and solving a bargaining game explicitly,
the present paper relies instead on a method close in spirit to the revelation
principle. In particular, I will derive incentive, participation and disclosure
constraints that are common to any equilibrium of any bargaining game. As
it turns out, under some circumstances, incentives to acquire information can
be compared on the basis of these common constraints alone.
To derive these common constraints, think of any given bargaining game.
If it comes in extensive form, consider the associated normal form with strat-
egy sets Ap and Bp (pure strategies) and A and B (mixed strategies) from
which parties A and B, respectively, choose their bargaining strategies simul-
taneously. At strategy prole (a; b) 2 A  B, the (possibly mixed) decision
q(a; b) 2 Q is assumed to result whereas T (a; b) denotes the resulting (ex-
pected) payment from A to B. Notice, the set A and B of available bargaining
strategies and the outcome in terms of decisions q(a; b) and payments T (a; b)
do not depend on the actual move ! of nature but the partiespayo¤s do.
In fact, the payo¤s of parties A and B amount to
V (!; q(a; b))  T (a; b) and T (a; b)  C (!; q(a; b)) ;
respectively. The game in normal form with A and B as strategy sets and
the above payo¤ functions is played whenever party A remains silent, be it
that A does not know the move of nature or that A knows ! but hides it.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of mutually best responses com-
bined with consistent beliefs. Given that party B does not learn the move
of nature on his own, his best response always consists of a non-contingent
bargaining strategy bN 2 B.
Party A may or may not know the true move of nature. If she does not
know it, her best response consists of a non-contingent bargaining strategy
aN 2 A as well. If, however, she knows the true move ! of nature yet hides
it, her bargaining decision aN(!) 2 A may still be state-contingent.
To qualify as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the following conditions of
mutually best responses must be met. If A does not know the move of
nature, she chooses a non-contingent best response
aN0 2 argmax
a2A
E

V (!; q(a; bN))
  T (a; bN)
to Bs equilibrium strategy bN . If, however, she knows ! to be the true move
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of nature, her best response
aN(!) 2 argmax
a2A
V (!; q(a; bN))  T (a; bN)
to bN may well be state-contingent. For convenience, I am specifying such a
best response even for moves ! of nature where A, by disclosing voluntarily,
would trigger the cooperative bargaining outcome instead.
Let
qN0 = q
 
aN0 ; b
N

and TN0 = T
 
aN0 ; b
N

denote the equilibrium outcome if A does not know the move of nature and
let
qN(!) = q
 
aN(!); bN

and TN(!) = T
 
aN(!); bN

denote the possibly state-contingent equilibrium outcome if A knows the true
move of nature to be !. The corresponding payo¤s of party A are denoted
as
N0 (!) = V (!; q
N
0 )  TN0
and N(!; !), respectively, where
N(!; !0) = V (!; qN(!0))  TN(!0)
would correspond to As payo¤ if she knows the true move of nature to be !
but would negotiate as if it were !0.
Since these outcomes are based on best responses, the following incentive
constraints have to be met:
N(!; !0)  N(!; !) for all !; !0 2 
 (1)
N0 (!)  N(!; !) for all ! 2 
 (2)
and
E

N(!; !0)
  E N0 (!) for all !0 2 
 (3)
The rst set of inequalities corresponds to the traditional incentive con-
straints whereas the second one means that the informed party A cannot
gain from negotiating as if she were uninformed. The third set, nally, corre-
sponds to the case where the uninformed party A cannot gain from bargaining
as if she had observed !0 as the true state of nature.
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Since, by disclosing voluntarily, party A can trigger the cooperative bar-
gaining outcome, further constraints, referred to as disclosure constraints,
have to be met. If she discloses the (true) move of nature ! her negotiated
payo¤amounts to  (!). Let 
N0 be the event in which the informed party
A prefers to be silent. The complementary set 
N1 = 
n
N0 corresponds to
the event in which the informed party A discloses voluntarily. For As dis-
closure strategy to be optimal, the following disclosure constraints have to
be met in equilibrium. If
N(!; !) <   (!) then ! 2 
N1 (4)
whereas if
  (!) < N(!; !) then ! 2 
N0 (5)
must hold.
At the investment stage, party A is assumed to anticipate the outcome
of bargaining. If she decides to become informed with probability x, her
expected payo¤ amounts to
v(x) = E

N0 (!)

+ x v   k(x)
where
v = (
N0 )  E

N(!; !)  N0 (!) j 
N0

+ (6)
+(
N1 )  E

  (!)  N0 (!) j 
N1

denotes As private value of being informed under voluntary disclosure. In
equilibrium, she chooses investments
xv 2 argmax
x
v(x)
that maximize her objective function.
To qualify as an equilibrium, party B must also choose a best response to
party As bargaining strategy as described above. To this end, party B forms
beliefs pN concerning the probability of party A being informed conditional on
A remaining silent. Given such beliefs, party Bs best response bN maximizes
his expected payo¤  N(b) which is dened as
 N(b) = (1  pN)  E T (aN0 ; b)  C(!; q(aN0 ; b))+
+pN  E T (aN(!); b))  C(!; q(aN(!); b)) j 
N0  :
13
Moreover, in equilibrium, these beliefs must be consistent which means that
pN =
xv  (
N0 )
1  xv + xv  (
N0 )
has to hold.
By not signing a contract, each party can unilaterally trigger the no trade
decision q = 0 and zero payments. As a consequence, equilibrium payo¤s
have to be non-negative. The corresponding constraints are referred to as
participation constraints. But notice, participation does not mean that trade
will necessarily take place.
In particular, if A discloses ! (i.e. ! 2 
N0 ), then N(!; !)  0 must
hold for such moves of nature. If A does not learn the move of nature,
E[N0 (!)]  0 must hold for similar reasons.
Party Bs expected payo¤ N(bN) if A remains silent must be non-negative
in equilibrium as well to satisfy Bs participation constraint.
Based on the above notions, the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 2 (i) Under voluntary disclosure, the private gain from being
informed must be non-negative, i.e. v  0:
(ii) If it would be too costly to know the true move of nature for sure (i.e.
if xv < 1) then E

0(!)  N0 (!)
  0 must hold.
(iii) If it would be too costly to know the true move of nature for sure
and if, under symmetric information, party A has all the bargaining power
(i.e. if xv < 1 and  = 1) then v   and, hence, party A has excessive
incentives to invest as compared with rst best investments.
Proof. (i) For any ! 2 
, it follows from (2) that N(!; !) N0 (!)  0.
Moreover, due to the disclosure constraint (4),   (!)  N(!; !) and,
hence,   (!)   N0 (!)  0 hold for all ! 2 
N1 . It then follows from (6)
that v  0 must hold indeed. Claim (i) is established.
(ii) It follows from Bs participation constraint that
(1  pN)  E N0 (!)+ pN  E N(!; !) j 
N0 
 (1  pN)  E S(!; qN0 )+ pN  E S(!; qN(!)) j 
N0 
 (1  pN)  E [0(!)] + pN  E

(!) j 
N0

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and, hence,
(1  pN)  E 0(!)  N0 (!)  pN  E N(!; !)  (!) j 
N0  =
= pN  E N(!; !)    (!) j 
N0   0
must hold. Therefore, since xv < 1 and, hence, pN < 1,
E

0(!)  N0 (!)
  0
must hold. Claim (ii) is established.
(iii) It follows from (6) that
v   = (
N0 )  E

N(!; !)  N0 (!)  (!) + 0(!) j 
N0

+
+(
N1 )  E

  (!)  N0 (!)  (!) + 0(!) j 
N1

=
= (
N0 )  E

N(!; !)  (!) j 
N0
 
 (
N1 )  E

  (!) j 
N1

+ E

0(!)  N0 (!)

and, since  = 0, from claim (ii) that v    0 must hold. Claim (iii) is
established as well.
If the information has no social value, i.e.  = 0, then, under voluntary
disclosure, investment incentives are always excessive as follows from claim
(i). Moreover, if party A has all the bargaining power whenever she triggers
the cooperative solution, i.e. if a = 1, then investment incentives remain
excessive even if information has social value.
5 Binary trade decision
To gain insights beyond proposition 2, the setting is now simplied to binary
trade decisions. In this case, the set of pure decisions contains just two
elements Qp = f0; 1g and the set of mixed decisions Q coincides with the
unit interval [0; 1]. Under the mixed decision q 2 Q, trade occurs with
probability q whereas no trade is the outcome with probability 1  q.
At move ! 2 
 of nature and decision q 2 Q, party As expected utility
amounts to V (!; q) = v(!)  q; party Bs expected cost to C(!; q) = c(!)  q.
If E[v(!)] < E[c(!)] then, in the absence of information, no trade should
take place (i.e. q0 = 0) and, hence, the surplus 0(!) = S(!; 0) = 0 would
vanish for all moves of nature.
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Particular attention will be paid to two subcases at the extreme edges of
the binary trade setting to which I refer to as selsh and cooperative acqui-
sition of information, respectively. Under selsh acquisition of information,
the move of nature directly a¤ects only the party who searches for informa-
tion. More precisely, this means that party As willingness-to-pay v(!) is a
function of the move ! of nature but party Bs cost of production is not, i.e.
c(!)  c0 remains constant under all moves of nature.
For cooperative acquisition, it is the other way round. While costs of
production c(!) now are a function of the move ! of nature, the willingness-
to-pay is equal to some constant value v(!)  v0.
The following two propositions deal with one of these two subcases each.
Proposition 3 In the case of selsh acquisition of information (i.e. c(!) 
c0) the following claims are valid:
(i) If, in the absence of information, trade would be ine¢ cient then trade
will neither take place in equilibrium and   v  m must hold, that
is even under voluntary disclosure incentives to invest would be insu¢ cient
as compared with rst best investments. Under mandatory disclosure, invest-
ment incentives would even be lower.
(ii) If, under symmetric information, party A has positive bargaining
power (i.e.  > 0) and if party A observes the true move ! of nature but
hides it (i.e. ! 2 
N0 ) then the negotiated equilibrium outcome will be ex post
e¢ cient, i.e.
qN(!) 2 argmax
q2Q
[v(!)  c0]  q
must hold.
Proof. (i) Given that trade would be ine¢ cient in the absence of infor-
mation, expected willingness-to-pay must be lower than the known costs, i.e.
E[v(!)] < c0: Since q0 = 0, 0(!) = 0 must hold for all moves ! of nature.
Moreover, to satisfy party Bs participation constraint, c0 qN0  TN0 must
hold (B knows c0). To ensure the uninformed party As participation, TN0 
E[v(!)]  qN0 must also hold. Combining the two participation constraints
yields c0  qN0  E[v(!)]  qN0 from which qN0 = 0 follows immediately, i.e.
trade does not take place in equilibrium. This settles the rst part of claim
(i).
16
As a consequence,
N0 (!) = v(!)  qN0   TN0 = 0
must hold for all moves ! of nature if E[v(!)] < c0:
To compare investment incentives, it follows from (6) that
  v
= (
N0 )  E

   0   N + N0 j 
N0

+
+(
N1 )  E

     0  +N0 j 
N0

= (
N0 )  E

   N j 
N0

+ (
N1 )  E

   j 
N0

 E 0   N0 
must hold.
The second term is obviously non-negative because   (!)  0 always
holds whereas the third term vanishes as shown in the rst part of this proof.
The rst term, nally, has to be non-negative for the following reason.
If the move of nature ! 2 
N0 remains hidden then TN(!)  c0  qN(!)
must hold as follows from Bs participation constraint. Since the social sur-
plus in equilibrium amounts to S(!; qN(!)), it follows that
N(!; !) = S(!; qN(!))  TN(!)  c0  qN(!)  S(!; qN(!)):
As the actual surplus S(!; qN(!)) cannot exceed the maximum surplus (!),
it follows that (!)   N(!; !)  0 must hold for all ! 2 
N0 and, hence,
the rst term has to be non-negative as well. The claim   v is fully
established.
To establish the remaining part of claim (i), it follows from (6) that
v  m
= (
N0 )  E

N   N0      +   0 j 
N0

+
+(
N1 )  E

  0   N0 j 
N0

= (
N0 )  E

N      j 
N0

+ E

  0   N0

must hold. The rst term is non-negative as follows from the disclosure
constraint (5) whereas the second term vanishes as was shown in the rst
part of this proof. Claim (i) is fully established.
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(ii) Suppose ! 2 
N0 . If no trade takes place in equilibrium, i.e. if
qN(!) = 0 then N(!; !) = 0    (!) must hold as follows from the
disclosure constraint (5). Since   (!)  0 holds by denition and a < 1
by assumption it follows that (!) = 0 and, hence, that trade would be
ine¢ cient indeed.
If, however, trade takes place in equilibrium, i.e. qN(!) = 1 then c0 =
c  qN(!)  TN(!)  v(!)  qN(!) = v(!) must hold as follows from the two
partiesparticipation constraints. Therefore, if trade occurs in equilibrium
then c0  v(!) such that trade would be e¢ cient in this case as well. Claim
(ii) is established.
Suppose trade would be ine¢ cient in the absence of information. Then,
as the above proposition shows, the negotiated outcome under voluntary
disclosure will always be ex post e¢ cient.
If, however, trade would be e¢ cient even in the absence of information
trade need not necessarily take place under voluntary disclosure. Moreover,
comparing the incentives to acquire information may become ambiguous be-
cause some terms in the di¤erences  v and v  m are negative such
that the comparison of incentives depends on the exact shape of distribution
functions. The above proposition, in contrast, holds universally, independent
of any particular shape of probability distributions.
The next proposition deals with acquisition of information of the cooper-
ative type. While costs c(!) are a function of the move of nature, the utility
v0 from trade remains constant. In this case, party As payo¤ has to be
constant as well.
Proposition 4 In the case of cooperative acquisition of information (i.e.
v(!)  v0), the following claims are true:
(i) There exists a constant value n0  0 such that
N(!; !) = N0 (!) = n0
holds for all moves of nature.
(ii) Suppose trade would be ine¢ cient in the absence of information. Then
investment incentives under voluntary disclosure are lower as compared with
mandatory disclosure, i.e. m  v.
Proof. To establish claim (i), use of the incentive constraints is made.
In the binary trade setting, the incentive constraints (1) can conveniently be
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summarized in the following way. For any two moves ! and !0 of nature, the
pair
N(!; !0)  N(!; !) and N(!0; !)  N(!0; !0)
of incentive constraints is equivalent to the two constraints
[v(!0)  v(!)]  qN(!)  N(!0; !0)  N(!; !)  [v(!0)  v(!)]  qN(!0):
Since, in the case of cooperative acquisition, v(!) = v(!0) = v0; it follows
N(!0; !0) = N(!; !) = n0
must hold for some constant value n0.
For the uninformed party A, the incentive constraint (3) requires that
E

N0 (!)

= v0  qN0   TN0 = N0 (!) 
v0  qN(!0)  TN(!0) = N(!0; !0) = n0
holds for all moves !0 of nature whereas the incentive constraints (2) require
N0 (!) = v0  qN0   TN0  N(!; !) = n0
to hold for all moves ! of nature. Combining the above inequalities leads to
the conclusion that
N0 (!) = n0
must also be satised for all ! 2 
. Claim (i) is established.
To establish claim (ii), it follows from (6) that
m  v
= (
N0 )  E

       0   N + N0 j 
N0

+
+(
N1 )  E

N0     0 j 
N0

= (
N0 )  E

  (   0) j 
N0

+ (
N1 )  E

n0     0 j 
N0

must hold. The rst term is non-negative because  denotes the maximum
surplus whereas the second one must be non-negative because, in the absence
of information, trade would be ine¢ cient and, hence, 0(!) = 0 must hold
for all moves of nature. The proposition is fully established.
Suppose, in the absence of information, trade would be ine¢ cient. Then,
in the case of cooperative acquisition of information, investment incentives
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are lower under voluntary than under required disclosure which, in turn,
remain insu¢ cient relative to rst best. Worse, under voluntary disclosure,
the negotiated outcome may even fail to be ex post e¢ cient. In this case,
mandatory disclosure clearly outperforms voluntary disclosure on e¢ ciency
grounds.
If, however, trade would be e¢ cient in the absence of information then
comparing investment incentives may become ambiguous again unless party
A has the entire bargaining power (i.e.  = 1). Endowed with the entire
bargaining power, her investment incentives under voluntary disclosure ex-
ceed those under mandatory disclosure as follows from Proposition 2 quite
generally whereas mandatory disclosure would lead to the rst best solution.
To conclude this section, let me point out that the intensity relations
as established by the above propositions need not necessarily hold in the
strict sense. In fact, if party A has encompassing bargaining power (i.e.
 = 1) investment incentives under voluntary disclosure have been shown to
be excessive quite generally such that v   will hold. If combined with
the results for the binary trade setting, it follows that party A has e¢ cient
incentives to invest under voluntary as well as mandatory disclosure. Yet, at
less than full bargaining power (i.e.  < 1), the intensity relations established
for the binary trade setting may well hold in the strict sense.
6 Conclusion
The acquisition of information prior to sale gives rise to a hold-up situation
quite naturally. Since the acquisition takes place before parties have agreed
on a contract and since the information may be of specic value for the seller-
buyer relationship the setting is reminiscent indeed of the models pioneered
by Grossman and Hart (1986). But while in the vast majority of contri-
butions to the hold-up literature parties are assumed to agree ex ante on
some contract, incomplete as it may be, in the present setting, they meet for
the rst time after information has already been acquired and corresponding
investments are sunk.
As a substitute for ex ante contracting, disclosure duties are provided and
governed by law and by courts. Such duties, if anticipated, a¤ect incentives
to search for information. Not unexpectedly, a mere policy choice between
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required and voluntary disclosure fails to generate e¢ cient incentives for
information acquisition and, as usual in a world below rst best, comparing
incentives on e¢ ciency grounds becomes cumbersome.
Most previous contributions to the hold-up literature assume ex post
negotiations to take place among symmetrically informed parties where the
outcome can easily be described by cooperative solution concepts such as
split the di¤erence. Yet, if acquisition of information prior to sale combined
with voluntary disclosure is at stake, such a convenient short-cut is no longer
available.
There are two ways out. Either a non-cooperative bargaining game is
specied explicitly. Except for very simple specications, the solution may
become di¢ cult to calculate. Alternatively, investment incentives may be
derived from constraints that are shared by all bargaining outcomes. The
present paper has opted for the second approach.
Under a regime where information can be voluntarily disclosed but can-
not be misrepresented, disclosure constraints come on top of the more usual
incentive and participation constraints. Use exclusively of such constraints
is made to compare incentives for acquiring information prior to sale under
mandatory versus voluntary disclosure.
Courts are still struggling with the disclosure topic. Deutsche Telekom
which, in 2000, went public with a set of their shares may serve as an il-
lustration. The prospectus contained an estimate of the value of Telekoms
real estate. After the stock value of Telekom has fallen substantially, buyers
claimed that the estimate of real estate as listed in the prospectus was suf-
fering from a strong upwards bias and has misled the plainti¤s to buy the
stocks by mistake. In 2012, the case has been ruled against the plainti¤s and
in favour of Deutsche Telekom by a court (OLG) in Frankfurt.
Plainti¤s had accused Deutsche Telekom of outright misrepresentation of
information acquired by the seller prior to sale. The present paper concen-
trates on truthful revelation versus hiding of acquired information only. In-
cluding the possibility of outright misrepresentation may be a subject worth-
while for future research where the methods of the present paper may prove
useful again.
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